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stehung spiegelt. Zwar verengt die erst seit 1923 geläufige Bezeichnung Einsamer Baum den 
Bildsinn, doch ist unbestritten, dass der Baum im Emporstreben wie im Absterben seiner oberen 
Äste Friedrichs Weltbild emotional wiedergibt. Für die historische Emotionsforschung ist im 
übrigen auch von Interesse, dass die Mitleid und Trost suchende Bezeichnung Einsamer Baum
gerade in den Jahren nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg aufkam. 
10 Es liegt nicht im Sinne dieser Einleitung, die kaum mehr überschaubare Fülle der Literatur zur 
Emotionsforschung einer kritischen Würdigung zu unterziehen. Es sei jedoch verwiesen auf 




Empathy, Motion and Emotion* 
I
Take two subjects often by encountered by historians of art: the Conversion of St 
Paul and the Ecstasy of St Teresa. In their pathfinding article on sudden religious 
conversions in cases of temporal lobe epilepsy, Dewhurst and Baird recalled the 
suggestion, first made by Lombroso in 1864, that St Paul’s conversion, with its 
auditory hallucinations, photism, and temporary blindness, was the result not of a 
mystical experience (whatever that may involve), but of an epileptic seizure.1
They believed that St Teresa of Avila’s visions, chronic headaches and transient 
losses of consciousness could be attributed to temporal lobe epilepsy.2 In the case 
of St Paul, William James was appropriately sceptical about what he called “me-
dical materialism”, and of physical explanations of Paul’s conversion in terms of 
“a ‘discharging lesion’ of the occipital cortex” (as an alternative to the mystical 
hypothesis).3 Significantly, Dewhurst and Beard preferred to overlook his scepti-
cism. Others suggested that St Paul’s hallucinations may simply have resulted 
from the fact that he was a tired traveller who had neglected his midday siesta; or 
that his conscience was possibly complicated by a “migraine-like syndrome”.4
Neurology informs history. One does not need to be a medical materialist to 
acknowledge the possibility. Purely historical contextual factors are unlikely to 
be adequate to a full account of the syndromes demonstrated by the behaviors 
of St Paul and St Teresa.5 Given the vast amount of recent research dedicated to 
understanding the neural substrate of corporeal and emotional responses, it 
ought no longer to be possible to speak of the social construction of behavior in 
terms that are uninflected by attention to the anatomy, biology and chemistry of 
the human brain, or to its mechanisms, routes and deficits. It is important, I 
think, to take heed of recent advances in the neurosciences, without believing 
that to say “human” jeopardizes our individuality or overlooks the social and 
political pressures that contribute to its social construction. 
Much of the resistance in the humanities to general statements about the hu-
man brain is based on the fear that to embrace the findings of science might 
entail the surrender of context, whether social or historical. But it need not. The 
18
convention of excluding biology from the understanding of historical behaviors 
has outlived its usefulness. For how can one speak of context in the absence of 
knowledge of the limits and possibilities of those aspects of human behavior 
that lie beyond conscious control? Or without considering the growing eviden-
ce for automatic aspects of somatic and emotional responses? 
II
Charles Darwin’s last work The Expression of the Emotions in Man and 
Animals of 1872 has been underappreciated until recently.6 It offers a rich 
field for historians of art. By now it should have entered much more pro-
minently into the long history of the subject of the expression of the emoti-
ons.7 The critical underlying hypothesis in Darwin was that the emotions 
are not only to be understood in terms of geographical and cultural con-
straints, but rather that there is a fixed relation between the outward ex-
pression of emotion and the particular emotion underlying that expression 
(an idea that art historians know from the works of Charles Le Brun, Marin 
Cureau de la Chambre and Lavater, but has now found its most vigorous 
exponent in Paul Ekman).8 The very fact that the emotions were capable of 
classification had a direct bearing, as Darwin put it, on “the unity of man”. 
The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals is the only extensi-
vely illustrated work by Darwin. The significance of his turn to pictures is 
manifold. Darwin’s book made use of photography in order to illustrate the 
classification of the emotions. Photography had only recently achieved the 
ability to freeze figures in movement, and the essential mobility of expres-
sions and gestures too.9 It was thus eminently useful for the purposes of 
classification, since classification is an approach to understanding the 
world that is predicated on forms of fixity. It places things, phenomena, 
and expressions in boxes, in limited spaces, in categories and classes, 
precisely in order to establish sensible relationships.10 For centuries this 
had been one of the chief ways of grasping the world. 
But the principles of evolution and natural selection, as earlier set out by 
Darwin, subverted the primacy of classification, and made it seem less 
central a task in the early life sciences. Evolution stood at odds with the 
possibility of the time-denying spaces of traditional systems of classificati-
on. Towards the end of his life, in his study of the emotions, Darwin came 
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round to classification as a heuristic principle once more; and he seems 
instantly to have realized the indispensability of pictures to that task. All 
this, of course, implies that the emotions, and the expression of emotions, 
are indeed capable of classification in the first (or last) place.11
III
In The Power of Images I described a variety of emotional and bodily re-
sponses to works of art that seemed to be recurrent across time and geo-
graphy. Perhaps it was the very idea recurrence that led to the sharp allegati-
ons of having prioritized innate responses (even though I barely used the 
word), as if “innate” were somehow a word at odds with the sacrosanct 
notions of context and the social construction of responses. But it is not; and 
in an illuminating example in his book, Darwin suggests why. As always he 
took an example predicated on the body and on bodily needs: We Europeans 
are so accustomed to kissing as a mark of affection, that it might be thought 
to be innate in mankind; but this is not the case. Steele was mistaken when he 
said “Nature was its author, and it began with the first courtship.” Jemmy 
Button, the Fuegian, told me that this practice was unknown in his land. It is 
equally unknown with the New Zealanders, Tahitians, Papuans, Australians, 
Somals of Africa, and the Esquimaux. But it is so far innate or natural that it 
apparently depends on pleasure from close contact with a beloved person; 
and it is replaced in various parts of the world, by the rubbing of noses, as 
with the New Zealanders and Laplanders, by the rubbing or patting of the 
arms, breasts, or stomachs, or by one man striking his own face with the 
hands or feet of another. Perhaps the practice of blowing, as a mark of affec-
tion, on various parts of the body may depend on the same principle.12
A universal expression of affection – contact of body to body – is modified 
by culture. The first of Darwin’s three principles of expression was that of 
serviceable associated habits, which he elaborated as follows: Certain com-
plex actions are of direct or indirect service under certain states of the mind, 
in order to relieve or gratify certain sensations, desires, &c.; and whenever 
the same state of mind is induced, however feebly, there is a tendency 
through the force of habit and association for the same movements to be 
performed, though they may not then be of the least use.13
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For Darwin the principal issue was the relationship between force of habit 
and heredity; but the relevance of these words for the notion of empathy – 
whether in late nineteenth century or early twenty-first century writers – can 
easily be deduced. In this essay, I will set out some of the new principles of the 
relationship between physical movement and emotion (indeed, Darwin’s first 
principle specifically “applies to the nerves of motion and sensation, as well as 
to those connected with the act of thinking”). If actions so “readily become 
associated with other actions and with various states of mind,”14 one must 
surely consider what happens when one sees actions performed by others, 
whether in reality or in pictures, that bring to mind habitual actions of one’s 
own. I say “bring to mind”, because of the ways in which the premotor and 
somatosensory cortices are directly and effectively activated by observation of 
the actions or movements of others. And while Darwin was concerned with the 
expressive movement of the muscles (say of the face), the present discussion 
will be centred on felt movement of the body rather than on actual movements, 
and on the emotions that ensue but are not necessarily expressed. 
In summarizing his first principle, Darwin made it clear that “serviceable 
actions become habitual in association with certain states of mind, and are 
performed whether or not of service in each case”.15 The question of 
whether states of mind precede actions or vice-versa was also addressed by 
William James and others16, but in this instance Darwin was pointing to the 
possibility of the automatic or unconscious responses as the result of habit 
or association, or, more precisely, of the induction of particular states of 
mind as a result of those habits or associations. 
Already in his first principle Darwin noted that “some physical change is 
produced in nerve cells or nerves which are habitually used”, and that “this 
applies to the nerves of motion and sensation, as well as to those connected 
with the act of thinking”. Even more explicitly, he observed that “when our 
minds are much affected so are the movements of our bodies”.17 And in his 
third principle of expression, “that of the direct action of the nervous sy-
stem” he turned directly to the role of the latter. He elaborated it as The
principle of actions due to the constitution of the Nervous System, indepen-
dently from the Will, and independently to a certain extent of Habit.18 From 
this, Darwin could proceed to the biological and bodily manifestations of 
emotion in a way that strongly prefigures current work on empathy. 
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IV
For many years I made three proposals to fellow historians of art in parti-
cular and to scholars of the humanities in general. The first was to consider 
the potential of drawing connections between how pictures look and how 
beholders respond to them on the level of emotions and feeling.19 In 1987 I 
suggested the possibility of determining what I then referred to as the 
neurophysiology of visual and psychological responses to particular forms; 
and implied that this might entail the assumption of certain biological and 
psychological invariances across cultures.20 This was not a claim against 
difference; it was quite precisely in favor of considering the ways in which 
responses might be culturally and historically inflected. Yet the resistance 
was profound. Art historians stood back from the challenge laid down by 
the cognitive neuroscientists, including those who who had begun to set 
out aspects of the specific work of the brain in the creation of and respon-
ses to works of art.21 It was a deep challenge, since it involved a reconside-
ration of traditional scepticism about the possibilities of bridging the disci-
plinary gap. It meant acknowledging the hermeneutic potential of the 
relationship between the neuronal bases of response and their historical and 
cultural inflection. Even these days, when the evidence for genetic and 
evolutionarily determined responses has grown so substantially, little 
seems to shake the resistance to understanding the neurobiology of behavi-
ors, particularly corporeal behavior 22 The standard social sciences model 
continues to prevail in the humanities,23 and the dominant mode in the 
study of the history of art remains the social history of art. Other approa-
ches continue to be anathematized, as if social history and biology were 
doomed to be at eternal odds with each other. 24 But they are not. 
My second proposal was that the emotions might indeed be classifiable. The 
common position in the humanities has continued to be that the emotions are 
too ragged and too specific – personally, culturally and historically – to be 
capable of definition in transcultural terms.25 Ekman’s research in particular 
suggested the possibility of identifiying a number of basic emotions, in terms of 
both feeling and expression.26 Over and over again I suggested that however 
culturally variable or contextually determined some responses might appear to 
be, it was important to take into account the increasing evidence for the identi-
fication of particular areas and neural networks in the brain responsible for 
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particular feelings and emotions.27. As the work of Klaus Herding and his 
colleagues has recently made clear, art historians are at last also beginning to 
give the emotions their due (or rather, since the emotions have always been 
taken more or less seriously in popular criticism, their epistemological due). 28
But the notion that some responses to works of art might be automatic or direct-
ly dependent on the structure and neural networks of the brain has remained 
hard to accept outside the cognitive sciences. 
My third claim, which now encounters less resistance (because of the fashion 
for “the body”), was that it was impossible, as Darwin and James already 
insisted, to conceive of the emotions apart from the body, and in particular 
apart form the movement of the body. It is probably this intimate nexus bet-
ween body and emotion that for so long lay at the basis of the intellectual 
unfashionability of the emotions, since the body remained an embarrassment 
for pleasures that were allegedly (and in retrospect preposterously) uncorporeal. 
Detachment from the body remains for many the hallmark of the esthetic. 
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For much of the twentieth century the emotions were excluded from the 
history and philosophy of art. These days old-fashioned art historians 
acknowledge that while it may be true that pictures arouse emotions and 
desire, this is not what art history is about. They – and most philosophers – 
maintain that when they go to a gallery they know that a painting is a just a 
painting, the sculpture just a sculpture, and that one doesn’t respond to a 
work as if it were real. Or they might say that one doesn’t really respond to 
it as if it were real – and maybe that one oughtn’t to either. 
R.G. Collingwood’s often-admired book The Principles of Art of 1938 
bluntly put forward the view that art has nothing whatsoever to do with the 
arousal of emotion.29 In his view, genuine artists do not strive after the 
production of emotional effects. This, he asserted, was best left to entertai-
ners and magicians (not to be confused with artists!). And he deplored 
those “numerous cases in which somebody claiming the title of artist deli-
berately set himself to arouse certain states of mind in his audience”.30
Collingwood cannot have recalled the case of Nicolas Poussin, who wro-
te explicitly to Chantelou in 1647 that paintings, like music, should be put 
together in such a way as to arouse the souls of those who behold it to 
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different passions, induire l’âme des regardants à diverses passions.31 Of 
course one could say, with regard to Collingwood, that Englishmen have 
always been notorious (according to the national cliché) for their inability 
fully to express their feelings and emotions.32
Moreover, the strain of German art theory in the second half of the nine-
teenth and early twentieth century that concerned itself deeply with the issue 
of emotional responses to art33 was almost entirely ignored by the German 
scholars who dominated twentieth century art history. For the most part, they 
were high rationalists, fearful of superstition and emotion. The emotions 
were felt to be too random, too embarrassing and too incidental to the trans-
cendental value of art. The three dominant modes in twentieth century art 
history thus came to be formalism, connoisseurship, and contextual studies of 
one kind or another. All excluded the emotions. Instead of attempting to 
discover relationships between the formal aspects of a work and the specific 
psychic efforts they generate, formalism remained purposeless; and both it 
and connoisseurship were placed disparagingly alongside each other, or 
replaced by contextual studies. From the late 1960s this became the main 
paradigm for art historical investigation. When I declared some time ago that 
I was planning a book entitled Mind, Body and Emotion in the History of Art,
I was written off both by progressive and by reactionary colleagues. 
Yet more than ever it seems legitimate to interrogate the relationships 
between the formal aspects of an image and the emotional responses they 
evoke; and to examine what might be codifiable or capable of correlation. 
But this idea has found surprisingly little resonance. One might think that 
to leave the emotions out of art was to suck art dry; but art history had first 
to be made academic – and therefore non-emotional. It is significant that 
E.H. Gombrich’s Art and Illusion, perhaps the finest attempt ever made to 
bring art and scientific psychology together, scarcely referred to the emoti-
ons -- and made no mention at all of the German tradition which did, and 
which bound physicality to emotion. 
Though I addressed some of these issues in my work on iconoclasm,34 and 
then in The Power of Images, my concerns were with symptoms, not with 
explanations. These concerns were neither neuroscientific nor much involved 
with approaches from cognitive psychology (then much more detached from 
the neurosciences than it has since become). It has only been with the work 
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of neuroscientists, such as Antonio Damasio, Joseph LeDoux, Giacomo 
Rizzolatti and his team from Parma, that some vindication has come. Before 
them, the only thinker to have seen the problem clearly – though with diffe-
rent theoretical and epistemological aims – was Nelson Goodman. In Lan-
guages of Art, Goodman attacked what he called “the domineering dichoto-
my between the cognitive and the emotive”. “On the one side”, he wrote in 
his typically vivid fashion, we put sensation, perception, inference, conjectu-
re, all nerveless inspection and investigation, fact, and truth; on the other, 
pleasure, pain, interest, saisfaction, disappointment, all brainless affective 
response, liking , and loathing. This pretty effectively keeps us from seeing 
that in esthetic experience the emotions function cognitively.35
Here is a writer whom Damasio, with his own project of combining reason 
and emotion,36 might have cited with profit. More recently, a few art histori-
ans have begun to take the emotions seriously, most notably James Elkins. 
But neither his Pictures of the Body, Pain and Metamorphosis, full of the 
most compelling illustrations,37 nor his Pictures and Tears: How a painting 
can make you cry,38 deal with the neural substrate of emotional response. 
These books are all about the emotions generated by pictures, and yet they 
offer no sense of how such emotions might arise (other than the vague idea 
that they are related to corporeal involvement), nor where they come from, 
nor what the connection might be between the look of a picture and the 
emotional response it triggers. In the Preface to Pictures of the Body, Elkins 
trenchantly remarks that “because the body intromits thought, important 
aspects of my reponses to a picture of a body might not even be cognized.”39
This, in slightly different terms, is one of the fundamental points of the pre-
sent paper, namely that the body’s handling of the visual information it 
receives via the brain may in many cases be precognitive. Yet in neither 
work does Elkins show any awareness of the remarkable work being done on 
the relationship between art, emotion, body and brain.40
VI
In what follows I will concentrate on aspects of neuroscientific research 
relevant to the old question of the relations between motion and emotion. 
In doing so I will touch on questions not only of apparently automatic 
behaviors (and of the brain correlates thereof), but also of the complex 
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question of embodied simulation and simulations that are felt rather than 
expressed through behavior.41 In other words, I will deal with the sense of 
reacting as if one were behaving in physical ways without actually thus 
behaving. This form of reaction, it seems to me, is of particular relevance 
to the ways in which one responds not only to other beings, but also to 
paintings and sculptures. I will be moving away from the kinds of visceral 
and outward emotional behaviours described at length in the Power of 
Images to their neural correlates. For the most part, the focus will be on 
recent work relating to the identification of specific cortical areas responsi-
ble for both our motor actions and our simulated actions. 
The question of the relations between inner and outward movement has a long 
history in the history of art and esthetics, from the famous controversy about the 
meaning of Rembrandt’s phrase “die meeste en de naetuereelste beweechgelick-
heit” in his 1639 letter to Constantijn Huygens42 to Aby Warburg’s 1893 Botticel-
li dissertation43 and the notion of the Pathosformel,44 via the writings of Robert 
Vischer, Hermann Lotze, Theodor Lipps, Johannes Volkelt and so on.45 The 
satisfaction will be to discover the neuroscientific resolution (or at least refine-
ment) of some older intuitions, hypotheses and theories. 
How does a picture or sculpture engage the body, and what are the emotional 
responses that may ensue?46 It is now possible to be more precise than ever before 
about the relations and correlations between corporeal and emotional responses. 
VII
In 1936/37 Virginia Woolf wrote about her responses to some terrible 
photographs of the Spanish Civil War. This morning’s collection contains 
the photograph of what might be a man’s body, or a woman’s; it is so 
mutilated that it might, on the other hand, be the body of a pig. But those 
certainly are dead children, and that undoubtedly is the section of a house. 
A bomb has torn open the side; there is still a birdcage hanging.47
In reading these lines it is impossible not to think of any one of the thou-
sands of photographs that have poured forth from the war zones in Ruanda, 
Bosnia, Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Woolf had no doubt at all about the universal disgust and horror which she 
believed such pictures must surely provoke. “Our sensations”, she insisted, 
are the same, “however different the education, the traditions behind us”.48
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In 2003, in her book on war photography entitled Regarding the Pain of 
Others, Susan Sontag took issue with Woolf. She resisted the assumptions 
that lay behind that “our” and that “us”. She felt that it was mistaken to 
suggest that photographs, however shocking, could somehow offer a uni-
versal basis for opposition to war, and that in any case, “we” could never 
suffer so much as the people shown in the photographs, or experience what 
the photographs showed.49 All this is banally true – but it misses the point. 
“Not to be pained by these pictures” Sontag continued, not to recoil from 
them, not to strive to abolish what causes this havoc, this carnage – these, 
for Woolf, would be the reactions of a moral monster. And, she is saying, 
we are not monsters, we members of the educated class. Our failure is one 
of imagination, of empathy; we have failed to hold this reality in mind.50
It is the core of both Woolf’s and Sontag’s arguments that require ex-
amination, not the conclusions they draw from them, with which it would 
be impossible to disagree. In fact, Sontag and Woolf are in accord about 
the immediate effects of the photographs of war and suffering. They are 
images that provoke horror and disgust. We are pained and recoil from 
them. And “we” can hardly bear to look at these photographs not just 
because of the obvious political and moral indignation they arouse, but 
because they touch on more basic, more visceral, more immediate and 
automatic levels of response. Sontag suggests that if we fail to be shocked 
by these images, it is a failure of both imagination and what she calls em-
pathy. She uses the term “empathy” in the popular sense of a deep sym-
pathy for those who are shown suffering. It is the sense that beholders 
often have of feeling that they somehow and to some degree can partake in 
the suffering of others. Sontag does not define the term at all. But it is 
capable of closer definition, along lines that bring us close to some of the 
fundamental ways in which humans relate to the images they see.51
The leitmotif of Sontag’s discussion is Robert Capa’s famous 1937 pho-
tograph of a Republican soldier falling backwards – or is it sideways? – at 
the very moment he is hit by an enemy bullet. In looking at this picture, 
grainy as it is, the phenomenology of spectatorial engagement with it 
seems relatively clear. Somehow one feels in ones own body the instability 
of the dying soldier. One seems to be falling oneself, off-balance, and yet 
vainly trying to keep oneself upright. It is almost as if, looking at this 
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picture, one has to stop oneself from flinging one’s own arm backwards, as 
if one were about to lose that recently-held gun oneself. (I will shortly 
discuss these “as if’s). The utter precariousness of the man’s physical state 
seems, momentarily, to be projected on to his beholders; or perhaps it 
would be better to say, becomes part of their own physical sensations. It is 
almost a relief to find that one is still seated – “normally”, one begins to 
say, but somehow not “normally” at all – as one looks at this image. One 
seems to feel in one’s bones (as we say – but perhaps in one’s head, as we 
shall see) that one is engaged in this picture. Our bodies respond to it as if 
that body, somehow, were our own. Momentarily we are left with a slight 
feeling of anxiety and desperation. Physical engagement with a picture like 
this, physical empathy, translates very swiftly into emotion.52
The tradition of empathy theory that was so prominent in German art 
theory in the second half of the nineteenth century merits reevaluation.53 It 
is of more than simple historical or even epistemological interest. For 
many years little attention was devoted to the notion that felt corporeal 
involvement in a painting or with a sculpture, or even in architecture, 
enables both physical and emotional empathetic responses.54 But recently 
there has been a certain renewal of interest in the subject55 – without any 
awareness of the contemporary evidence for the embodied simulation of 
observed actions and movements.56
In Das optische Formgefühl of 1873, Robert Vischer distinguished bet-
ween sensation and feeling in a way that anticipates recent neuroscientific 
distinctions between emotions and conscious feelings.57 Being at a lower 
stage in the perceptual process, sensations are more intuitive and precede 
conscious feeling – which in turn precedes empathetic feeling with the 
form of the object. Each of these stages, for Vischer, has to do with what 
he called the stimulation of “motor nerve function” and the relationship 
between the form of the object and our own bodily form.58 By Einfühlung
Visscher meant physical responses generated by the observation of forms 
within paintings. He set out at length how particular forms aroused particu-
lar responsive feelings, depending on their conformity to the design and 
function of the muscles of the body, from those of the eyes to the limbs and 
to to bodily posture as a whole. Developing Visscher’s ideas, the young 
Wölfflin outlined his views on the ways in which the observation of speci-
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fic architectural forms engage the beholder’s bodily responses.59 August 
Schmarsow wrote of the experiences of architecture in terms of muscular 
sensation, the sensitivity of the skin, and the structure of the body. Already 
before Vischer, Herman Lotze had argued that one invests every visual 
impression with emotional experience as a result of our understanding of 
thee physical motion within the image we see. Just before the century 
turned, Aby Warburg, adapting Vischer’s notions of Einfühlung developed 
his own theory of the Pathosformel, whereby the outward forms of move-
ment in a work of Renaissance art (say the hair or flowing draperies of a 
paintings by Botticelli or Ghirlandaio) revealed the inner emotions of the 
figure concerned.60 Already by then Theodor Lipps was developing his 
views of the relationship between esthetic enjoyment and bodily enage-
ment with space, in architecture as well as in the other arts.61 All these 
writers believed that the feeling of physical involvement in a piece of 
painting, sculpture or architecture not only provoked a sense of imitating 
the motion either seen or implicit in the work, but also elicited or even 
enhanced the emotional responses of the spectator. Wilhelm Worringer’s 
Abstraction and Empathy approached the problem rather differently from 
the other works mentioned here. Although it was concerned ways in which 
form is allegedly invested with life, it set the processes of empathy against 
what for Worringer was the opposing notion of abstraction, and thus led to 
his insistence on the superiority of the latter on the grounds that it was 
somehow purer for its distance from empathetic feeling. By then William 
James had also articulated the broader question of the relations between 
bodily action and emotion,62 while at the core of all of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s work from the 1940s on lies a profound concern with the ways in 
which beholders are and become corporeally involved in works of art, and 
in particular with the problem of felt movement in response to them. 
Current images from war zones provide no shortage of examples. To 
look, for instance, at the heart-rending 2001 photograph by Tyler Hicks of 
three Iraqi women grieving with their whole bodies over the lifeless body 
of their daughters, is to have a sense of simulating each one of their mo-
vements. It is to open ones own mouth (or to have a sense of doing so) in a 
similar form of the expression of sorrow, and to wish to cast outward ones 
own arms in grief in almost exactly the way the mother does. As ones eyes 
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traverse the scene, it seems as if ones own body is overcome by a kind of 
emulatory slump, as if in some attempted imitation of the prostrate position 
of the dead child (it is almost the same feeling of keenly empathetic slump 
as that provoked by the famous 1968 photograph by Don McCullin of the 
collapsed body of a North Vietnamese soldier). How easily one seems to 
grasp the pain of these figures through feeling the gesture of the woman 
clutching her hands over her chest in the background, or the desperation of 
the way in which the woman next to her moves her arms outward in grief! 
All these figures serve as trenchant reminders of the importance of War-
burg’s notion of the Pathosformel. Not only do the gestures ring humanly 
true, one also knows immediately how often one has seen them in art (in 
particular that of the wailing mother with her arms oustretched in sorrow, 
recalling the classic gestures of the Pietà). It is perfectly true that these are 
formulaic bodily expressions of grief, and that they form part of a reper-
toire of emotional expression via the body used by generations of sculptors 
and painters, or deliberately draw on yet more ancient vestiges (as in the all 
too well-known cases of Renaissance artists copying from antiquity). But 
these examples are so convincing because they feel – not just look – so 
convincing. It is not just case of having seen these gestures before, of 
knowing these particular cultural correlations between gesture and the 
expression of emotion. They are convincing because these are gestures that 
are predicated on a deep and intuitive body-knowledge linking movement 
to emotion. The better the artist is at conveying such body-knowledge, the 
more effective the beholder’s identification with it, and the better her 
understanding of the emotions such gestures and movements of the body 
are intended to convey. It is not, in the first instance, a matter of cultural 
knowledge; it is a matter of intuitive recognition via the body.63
Examples of just this conflation of intuitive body-knowledge and the long 
traditions of emotional expression through the body are legion. They include 
Giotto’s St John in the Lamentation in the Arena Chapel, the unforgettable 
terracotta group of Niccolo dell’Arca’s Lamentation in Santa Maria della 
Vita in Bologna, Rosso’s Pietà in the Louvre, the upraised arms of the Mary 
– as well as the slumped body of Christ – in Caravaggio’s Vatican Entomb-
ment, the opening page of Goya’s Desastres de la guerra, tellingly entitled 
Tristes Presentimientos. Anyone seeing the many modern images of war, 
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loss, destruction and grief, will immediately think of a host of similar exam-
ples from both the present and the past. The very fact that so many examples 
of this kind do indeed leap forward and present themselves to the mind’s eye 
is striking evidence of the peculiar trenchancy of certain classes of gesture, of 
specific types of physical movement. Another example – to take one of many 
possible instances from the history of art and now repeated in modern images 
of grief and atrocity – is the wiping of tears from the eyes with the back of 
the hand, such as Giotto so strikingly depicted above the Lamentation in the 
Arena Chapel, and Claus Sluter carved beneath the Crucifixion above his 
great Well of Moses in Dijon. All such movements, actions, and gestures 
strike deep chords within us – and it has now become possible to speak more 
clearly about what we mean when we say just this. 
It is not just a matter of the activation of cortical areas relating to memory, 
of the fact that responses to the Tylor Hicks photograph are somehow predi-
cated on recollection of similar images, or of a visual repertoire of forms. 
Ones responses are more basic than that; less cognitive, so to speak, more 
unconscious. They have to do with the activity of areas of the brain dedicated 
to the imitation of specific forms of movement in others. It is now possible to 
describe the neuronal bases of just this form of embodied simulation.64 The 
topic of empathy needs no longer to be regarded as a matter of sentimentali-
ty, or of armchair intuition. It can be shown to be predicated on a particularly 
striking form of the cortical representation of action. 
The idea that one might be able to describe the processes of empathy with 
any degree of precision is likely to meet with scepticism. Like emotion-talk it 
has long been disdained. For the most part, it has always been regarded as too 
intuitive, too individual, too variable. How could one ever adequately describe 
viewers’ identification with what they see in pictures – surely one step beyond 
any form of identification with living actors? Michael Fried65 and James El-
kins66 have long made a case for beholders’ identification with the bodies in 
pictures, such as occurs, for example, when a figure is seen from behind. 
Another clear instance of bodily empathy occurs when one looks at figures bent 
over to carry the weight that presses down on them, or at bodies such as the all-
too human atlantes that appear to support – with almost palpable strain – the 
Romanesque pulpit on Isola San Giulio, or the Bishop’s Throne in San Nicola 
in Bari, or the portal columns at Piacenza. So too with the keen sense of a 
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physical need for liberation and disentanglement from the bonds that so force-
fully restrain bodies in sculptures such as the Laocoon or Michelangelo’s 
Slaves, or with the general stirrings of discomfort one feels in looking at the 
extreme poses frequently encountered in Romanesque art. Such forms of iden-
tification have never been set out in anything but the vaguest terms; and whate-
ver strength of argument there has seemed to be has been purely rhetorical. 
Philosophers have endlessly discussed the problem of whether it is possi-
ble to feel the pain of others.67 The preponderant view has been a sceptical 
one. Most cling to the notion that we can only know very little about other 
minds, and that it is impossible to feel the pain of others – let alone the minds 
and pain of others in pictures (or sculptures). But it is precisely pictures – as 
much as experience – that give the lie to all this. Virginia Woolf’s vivid 
description of the horror and disgust any spectator is likely to feel upon 
looking at images of what might be a man’s body, or woman’s, or one, in-
deed, so mutilated that it might be a pig’s, rings all too true. It becomes hard 
to discredit our intuitions in cases such as these. The body in the picture 
commands our attention. This emerges even more clearly in the case of 
mutilated bodies, where two very strong sensations seem to be at work: a 
sharply enhanced awareness of our own body parts when those of others are 
missing or damaged;68 and the felt desire to reconstitute the body in the 
picture. It is very likely that the same desire for reconstitution and completion 
also applies to pictures of damaged buildings (especially given our psycholo-
gical and evolutionary sense of the shelter buildings offer); while there is 
clearly far too much of an associative burden to remain indifferent to dead 
children, let alone the poignancy of a birdcage hanging empty in a bombed-
out house.69 All this is too evocative; it plays on the seat of the imagination, 
to use archaic terms; and it provokes what we loosely call our empathy. 
VIII
Much good cognitive work has also been done in the last dozen years or so 
on affective responses to pictures, both pleasant and unpleasant. Teams under 
researchers such as Peter Lang (one of the pioneers of the study of emotional 
reactions to pictures) and Richard Davidson have done an array of experi-
ments involving eyeblink startle magnitude and corrugator and zygomatic 
muscle responses to pictures,70 while relatively simple heart rate and skin 
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conductance measurements may be obtained for visceral reactions.71 The 
imaging method of choice is now functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI), but PET (positron emission tomography) measurements of regional 
cerebral blood flow (rCBF) in the case of both pleasant and unpleasant visual 
(as well as auditory and olfactory) stimuli have also been made.72
To this array of work chiefly on negative responses one can now to add 
the very large amount of recent research on the amygdala.73 Its role in the 
neurophysiology of fear responses in particular, and of many other emotio-
nal reactions as well, is now well documented. The usual and most striking 
examples offered are of fear responses to snakes, but amygdalic responses 
to threatening faces and masks, animals baying and displaying their teeth, 
are of a similar order. The neural networks involved in the instinct for self-
preservation overlap with that of the emotions. The effectiveness of apo-
tropaia depends on this kind of instinctive knowledge as much as on the 
cultural connotations of what it represents. New knowledge of amygdalic 
processes and their interaction with the prefrontal cortex will further refine 
older views of evolutionary and biological responses to fear signals. 
One sees a snake and, startled, one runs away from it. One sees a picture of 
a snake, and thinking it real, wants to run away from it too; or we are startled 
or repulsed by the horrid look of a monstrous face or mask. Unfortunately, 
little neuroscientific work has so far been dedicated to this elision between 
reality and representation, to the distinction between responses to a snake and 
to a picture of a snake – or of a dog whose teeth are threateningly bared, or of 
a picture of some such.74 Images such as those that issued from Abu Ghraib 
make all too clear the effectiveness of the latter. There is a fair amount of art 
historical evidence for fear responses to pictures of snakes, as in Vasari’s 
account of Leonardo’s shield, which tells of how as an adolescent he careful-
ly painted a piece of wood with snakes and all kinds of other monsters and 
carefully choreographed its display in order to frighten his father.75 Recalling 
Caravaggio’s Medusa, Constantijn Huygens used his painting of Rubens’s 
Medusa with similar effects to those which Leonardo produced.76 It is hard 
not to start back as one sees the bared teeth of Copley’s shark (in Watson and 
the Shark) or to feel some form of empathetic response to the terrrified look 
of the young man in the water. In all such cases, one has an intuitive sense of 
the critical relationship between emotion and bodily movement. 
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Of course the question of the extent to which fear responses are top-down or 
bottom-up arises. One sees a snake or a picture of a snake; the signal goes via 
the thalamus to V1 (the primary visual area) where this visual information is 
processed. Ledoux claims that the fear stimulus may even go directly from the 
thalamic projections to the amygdala, bypassing the neocortex.77 But Damasio 
takes a slightly different view. He notes that the appraisal and definition of the 
emotionally competent stimulus, in this case fear, occurs in the sensory associa-
tion and higher order cerebral cortices, which then passes to the emotion trigge-
ring sites, not only the amygdala (in the case of fear) but also to the ventrome-
dial prefrontal and cingulate cortices. Each of these sites cause subsequent 
activity in other sites, such as the basal forebrain, the hypothalamus or the 
nuclei of the brain stem tegmentum, via a complex system of neural connecti-
ons.78 Chemicals released directly into the bloodstream chiefly by the hypotha-
lamus cause the changes in the internal milieu, the viscera, the musculoskeletal 
system, and various specific behaviours. Those who remain sceptical about the 
automaticity of certain emotional responses ought to bear in mind that there are 
more projections from the amygdala to the visual cortices than vice-versa.79
To the abundant work on the amygdala should now be added a series of still 
more recent studies examining the role of another of the second major emotio-
nal workhorse, the insula, and in particular the anterior insula in reactions and 
expressions of disgust, a rich topic often related to fear. 80 The anterior cingula-
te cortex also plays a significant role in awareness of these emotions. 
Following the lead of Ekman’s work on the correlations between particular 
emotions and their facial expression,81 a good deal of information is now 
available about the role of the facial fusiform area (FFA) in the right he-
misphere of the occipito-temporal cortex. fMRI scans have identified neu-
rons in this area that respond in this area respond selectively to human fa-
ces.82 Signals go directly from the visual cortex to the FFA, long before they 
arrive at the prefrontal cortex, where contextual factors are processed. 
Thanks to Ekman’s work on facial expressions, and Nancy Kanwisher’s and 
others’ work on the FFA,83 it is now possible to be clear about the distinction 
between the identification and the interpretation of facial expression. 
In another difficult recent example with clear resonance for the history of 
art, a comparison of the terrible images shown on Al-Jazeera of Margaret 
Hassan immediately prior to her execution in 2004 and earlier photographs of 
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her smiling leaves one with no doubt at all about the possibility of identifying 
constants of emotional expression. The fear and the cheerfulness are instantly 
and indisputably identifiable as such. Indeed, images such as these force one 
to rethink what for a long time had been regarded as a rather ponderously 
schematic, if not wholly aberrant, chapter in the history of art and physio-
gnomics. They oblige one to take seriously the historical studies of the out-
ward facial indicators of inner emotion, which Charles Le Brun perhaps most 
famously attempted to codify;84 and to acknowledge the similarities bet-
weeen the zygomatic indicators on the faces of those in extreme fear in the 
presence of their captors and executioners and the engravings Le Brun used 
to illustrate his own work on the facial expression of the emotions.85
As for the face, so too, perhaps even more significantly, for the body. 
The extrastriate body area (EBA), a neural system specifically dedicated to 
the visual perception of the body, and of the human body in particular, has 
recently been identified in the right lateral occipitotemporal cortex.86 When 
subjects are shown still photographs of human bodies and body parts there 
is a significantly stronger response in this body-selective area than when 
they view other other inanimate objects and object parts, and signficantly, 
than when they view the body parts of animals.87
The question of whether the EBA, as well as the FFA, and the parahippo-
campal place area (PPA)88 – another exceptionally relevant topic for picture 
response theory – is largely specified in the genome, or whether they primarily 
derive from the extensive lifetime experience an individual has with faces, 
places and bodies, is still open.89 It is not a simple question of brain wiring and 
geography versus the pressures of history and context. To describe the dedica-
ted functions of underlying structures of the brain is not to exclude differential 
symptomology, or even individual modulations of feeling. Functional segrega-
tion does not stand at odds with any evidence for cortical plasticity and the 
possibilities for reassignment of functions and responses within the brain. 
IX
The central problem of this paper is this: how might it be possible to des-
cribe more rigorously and less intuitively the ways in which the inward 
imitation of movement and action occurs and how does it issue in emotion? 
An important body of literature has been dedicated to the phenomenon 
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known as response facilitation, that is, the automatic tendency to reproduce 
an observed movement, whether with or without understanding (as in the 
case of Meltzoff and Moore’s well-known work on the imitative buccal 
and manual movements of babies). 90
Ever since the mid-1980s, a number of studies implicated regions of the 
superior temporal sulcus (STS) in the perception of biological motion, 
while about ten years ago Perrett and others identified neurons in the parts 
of the STS of monkeys that respond selectively not only to the appearance 
of the body and the face, but also ones that specifically discharge when the 
monkey observes movements such as walking, turning the head, bending 
the torso and moving the arms.91 It was not long before similar areas were 
identified in humans too. The discovery of single neurons in the STS that 
fire when biological actions are observed was interesting enough, but it did 
not go as far as one might have thought possible in terms of the relations-
hip between observation and physical empathy. 
In his excellent surveys of the neuroscience of the emotions, Damasio 
attempted to deal with the problem of how to explain observers’ corporeal 
involvement with pictures of things (not just bodies in motion), and to 
assess the emotional consequences of such involvement. He emphasized 
the impossibility of feeling an emotion without a sense of ones own body 
and bodily involvement in what one observes.92
In the course of these books, Damasio developed his “somatic marker 
hypothesis”, into an extended description of what he called the “as-if body 
loop”.93 He set out his view of how when one looks at paintings that arouse 
strong responses such as fear, the body itself is bypassed and the prefrontal 
cortices (especially the ventromedial prefrontal cortices) and amygdala mere-
ly tell the somatosensory cortex to organize itself in the explicit activity 
pattern that it would have assumed had the body been placed in the desired 
state and signaled upward accordingly 94 In The Feeling of What Happens
(and again in Looking for Spinoza), Damasio developed this “somatic marker 
hypothesis” into his concept of the “as-if body loop”, that is, that route by 
which the somatosensory cortex reacts as if it would have done if the body 
were actually present.95 He wanted to show how feelings – the conscious 
awareness of emotions – are related to neural mappings of the body state. 96
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The anterior insula in particular plays a critical role in the translation of 
information about body states into a variety of different emotions.97 Also 
critical to the understanding of observers’ physical involvement with pictu-
res, and felt emulation of the activities of other bodies, is the fact that in 
observing the bodily movements of others (and mutatis mutandis the repre-
sented bodily movements of others) the brain momentarily creates a set of 
body-maps that do not correspond exactly to the current reality of the body. 
This, of course is where the “as-if body loop” comes in.98 It is clear that the 
concept of as if responses is central to study of beholder’s sense of physical 
involvement with pictures and sculptures, indeed any form of visual repre-
sentation. Recent neuroscientific work on the once neglected area of action 
understanding is strongly relevant to the problem of empathy. If ever there 
were a field for serious interdisciplinary discussion it is this.99
About seventeen years ago, Giacomo Rizzolatti and his team of researchers 
in Parma discovered a particular group of visuomotor neurons in the rostral part 
of the ventral premotor cortex of macaque monkeys, area F5.100 Some of these, 
which respond chiefly to size and shape Rizzolatti called “canonical neurons”, 
but the ones that are of most interest in the present context are those he named 
“mirror neurons”, which discharge when the monkey observes an action as 
well as when it executes it.101 In other words, when this system is activated, the 
observation of an action – and in particular a goal-oriented action – leads to the 
activation of the very same parts of the neural network in the premotor cortex 
that is active during its execution.102 The congruence between the visual and 
motor responses of these neurons suggests that every time an action is observed 
there is an activation of the motor circuits of the observer.103 It was then disco-
vered that these same neurons also fire when the monkey observes such an 
action but does not actually imitate it. 
One can now begin to understand the basis for physical empathy with a 
picture, and therefore with the emotions shown in a picture. After the initial 
discovery in monkeys, a mirror system was also identified in humans, chiefly 
in the rostral part of the inferior parietal lobule, the caudal sector of the infe-
rior frontal gyrus, and, of course, the adjacent part of the premotor cortex,104
a region overlapping Broca’s area. This takes one into speculations about the 
relationships between visual responses, corporeal reactions and language that 
cannot be pursued here.105 As in the case of area F5 in monkeys, when hu-
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mans observe the actions of individuals or of figures in pictures, the motor 
representations of these actions are automatically retrieved in the same parts 
of the brain as when they are actually executed. As Gallese et al have most 
recently put it, these mirror mechanisms allow direct understanding of the 
meaning of the actions and emotions of others “by internally replicating or 
“simulating” them without any explicit reflective mediation”.106 They 
emphasize that conceptual reasoning is not necessary for this form of action 
understanding.107 Although we do not overtly reproduce the observed action 
ourselves, the same part of our premotor cortex becomes active “as if” we 
were executing the very same action one observes.108
Furthermore, in humans, even in the case of actions that are not directed 
towards an object, the relevant somatotopic activations may be observed in 
the premotor cortex and in the posterior parietal lobe, similar to that of the 
classical motor cortex homunculus.109 In this way visual representation is 
mapped directly onto motor representation of the observed action. 
The applicability of these findings to the ways in which beholders’ engage 
bodily with pictures is immense. In the case of the research on monkeys, 
mirror neurons responded more to goal-oriented or transitive actions like a 
hand grasping an apple, or reaching for a tool, or kicking an object.110 But it 
has now been demonstrated that the human mirror system in fact responds to 
a much wider range of actions than the monkeys.111 In humans, activation 
occurs during the observation of intransitive and mimed actions as well, and 
the facilitation of motor-evoked potentials recorded from the observer’s 
muscles is present in the case of apparently meaningless hand/arm gestures, 
as well as when we observe a transitive action.112 The implications of this for 
aesthetic as well as empathetic responses are substantial, since the imaginati-
ve completion of actions in pictures may now also be understood in terms of 
the automaticity of simulated body response to them. 
Goya’s Desastres de la Guerra provides an outstanding repertoire of test-
cases. Almost every one of these images is predicated on bodily engagement 
and the emotions that ensue when beholders of these works feel themselves 
emulating or actually imitating the same gestures of despair and grief as the 
victims, or somehow participating in the actions of executioners. The very 
opening page of the Desastres offers an ancient Pathosformel. It is not just a 
cultural manifestation of an emotional expression; it produces in its beholders 
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a strong sense of bodily simulation of arms outstretched in despair. On page 
after page, emotions and actions represented generate a response that is 
simulatory and clearly corporeal. To look at these images is to become aware 
of how much more occurs in the act of looking than simply registering the 
eyes cast upwards in some seemingly fruitless appeal, or the corners of the 
mouth helplessly turned down. In all such cases one feels prey to the emoti-
ons that ensue upon action. With Lo mismo (No. 3), one has a sense of rai-
sing ones own arms to bring down the hatchet; but then, noticing the upraised 
hand, outstretched fingers and wide-eyed look of the fur-capped figure who 
begins to ward off the blow, one also seems to want to stop oneself from 
bringing down that mortal instrument. 
Both this sense of restraint and of engagement enhance the esthetic ef-
fectiveness of the image here. It is at the very tips of ones fingers that one 
understands better how the female hands in No queren (No. 9) stretch into 
and scratch the face of an assailant. A similar empathetic feeling surely 
occurs in the case of the desperate clawings of the mothers in Rubens’s 
newly-discovered Massacre of the Innocents as they try to protect their 
children from being murdered; and it is combined with a further powerful 
feeling of self-restraint as one feels ones arms beginning to rise in imitation 
of the action of the soldier on the right, but then stops oneself in the reali-
zation that its consequence is the smashing of an infant to earth. 
Throughout Goya’s series, the emotional effectiveness of the image is pre-
dicated on the evocation of corporeal identification: the shudder in ones 
bones upon perceiving the nakedness of the bodies cast awkwardly, but in 
too exposed a way, into the ditch in Caridad (No. 27); or the objects thrust 
up anuses (in Populacho, No. 28, or Esto es pejor, No. 38); or groins are 
sawn into, or necks garrotted, and so on. We hunch down or tightly clasp our 
hands in terror, we cover our eyes as we would in fear or grief, just as all 
these protagonists do; we teeter in precarious places, with an actual physical 
sensation accompanying even the visual representation of the threat of dan-
ger – before, as it were, being hurled into the pit, or carried off naked in a cart 
(as in Carretadas al cementerio, No. 64; even though that figure is already 
dead, it is the imminent exposure of her pudenda that so vividly evokes a real 
sense of bodily threat). And throughout it all one experiences the embodied 
simulation of gestures, even if not actually executed. 
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In looking at these images, however, one realizes the force of the notion of the 
Pathosformel, and that Goya, like so many great artists, touches us not only in our 
minds but in our bodies; not just via our prefrontal cortex but also via the premo-
tor cortex, often unmediated by the frontal area of the brain. It is the activation of 
neural networks in the premotor and motor cortices that make us feel that we are 
actually engaging in the same action or reaction that we would have made or felt
had we been in the same situations as those we see only represented. 
But there is also a point, as just noted, at which we seem to stop oursel-
ves from overt imitative bodily action. Anyone concerned with the effecti-
veness of pictures will grasp the relevance of the findings of Baldissera et 
al. in which they describe the mechanism at spinal cord level that prevents 
actual execution of seen actions, thus leaving the cortical mechanisms 
described here free to “re-act” the observed movements without risk of 
overt movement generation.113 From this it ought also to be possible to-
wards to a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of “gating”, whereby 
whatever emotional response we might otherwise have had to a picture in a 
gallery, say, is instantly superseded by a more detached aesthetic response, 
a response normally – and rightly – viewed as entirely cognitive.114 Such 
findings, I believe, must surely now be joined to the ways in which one 
assesses an artist’s ability to engage viewer attention and involvement. 
But what of other possibilities, such as the imitative feels – to put it 
perhaps too plainly – that occur, say, in the case of Roger van der Weyden’s 
Deposition triptych in the Prado, where a large range of action understan-
dings is involved. These enhance empathetic responses to other more obvi-
ous emotional dimensions of the work. The issue is not just one of the emo-
tional responses generated by tears (or bloody body punctures, on which 
more below); it has to do with the ways in which we feel our bodies engaging 
in similar actions – or about to engage in similar actions, or inclined to enga-
ge in similar actions – to those of the actors in the picture, from the body-
slumps of Christ and the Virgin, to the varieties of hand-wringing and cogna-
te gestures of grief. This is a painting that has been shown by the icono-
graphers to be consciously predicated on the medieval notion of compassi-
on,115 but it depends precisely on the kinds of unconscious knowledge of the 
imitative movements of beholders that lies at the basis of the conscious skills 
of painters, such as those possessed, say, by Roger or by Giotto. 
40
The mechanisms whereby one understands the observed actions of 
others as a result of the activation of ones own neural representations also 
applies in a number of other areas directly related to the problem of em-
pathy, notably touch, disgust, compassion and, perhaps most importantly, 
the neural representation of pain affect. The question arises about how to 
speak of mirror activity that arises in a more overtly sensory context. 
The empathetic experience of one or or another variety of touch – for 
example, the spider that crawls across James Bond’s chest, the feel of the 
finger in Christ’s side in Caravaggio’s Doubting Thomas, or the nail 
through his hand in Grünewald’s Isenheim altarpiece – is common enough. 
So too are sensations of tingling, pricking or shivering upon seeing the 
body of another affected in this way, whether in pictures such as these or in 
the movies.116 Another recent article from the Parma group has demonstra-
ted that it would be wrong to think of cases such as these as a matter of a 
visual stimulus followed by a cognitive deduction of what these stimuli 
mean.117 Instead, vision of another person being touched automatically 
activates the cortical network of regions normally involved in the behol-
der’s own experience of being touched. fMRI experiments have shown that 
when people view others being touched, the same part of the secondary 
somatosensory cortex (the so-called SII-PV area) is activated as when they 
themselves are touched.118 Keysers and his colleagues found that this area, 
which starts in the depths of the lateral sulcus actually overlaps with the 
vision of touch area in the visual cortex, and that it is precisely this region 
of overlap that is activated upon observing another individual’s body part 
being touched by or touching another object.119
Significantly, part of the secondary somatosensory area also extends on-
to the convexity of the inferior parietal lobule,120 which is so involved in 
the mirror representation of motor actions. 
These overlaps have not yet been adequately discussed in the literature, 
although it has been noted that SII is a site of polymodal integration of a 
whole range of sensual responses.121 The exact route along which SII recei-
ves visual stimuli still remains at issue. What is clear is that the automatic 
non-cognitive activation of touch areas in SII and the cingulate cortex is very 
similar to the one observed in premotor and posterior parietal cortex during 
the observation of actions.122 The same neurons are activated when one sees 
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someone else pricking their finger as when one does so oneself. This can be 
extended still further to the feeling of the pain of others. In fact, the term 
allodynia has been proposed for the way in which one sometimes experien-
ces pain in a limb when seeing a sudden trauma – such as a blow – to a cor-
responding area of another person; and it has been suggested that this hype-
resthetic response may possibly be due to damage to areas of the parietal 
lobule, which, as has been noted, is in fact connected with the ventral premo-
tor cortex, where mirror neurons were first identified.123
Of course it is not just a matter of seeing the actual experiences of living 
others. Viewers of pictures such as Grünewald’s Crucifixion, or of Goya’s 
Desastres, are just as familiar with such forms of shock. Neurons in the EBA 
fire in response to these images of the tormented human body, and reactions are 
further reinforced as a result of the process of allodynia. The sense of shock is 
thus all the more immediate and effective.124 Hence the peculiar effectiveness 
of images of damage or mutilation to the body, as in so many of the images in 
the Desastres series, as well as the recurrent pictures of mutilation and torture 
in our own times.125 It is impossible not to think of the images from Abu 
Ghraib in this context, where a sense of bodily empathy and shared threat 
surely lies at the root of the profound shock they evoke. Indeed, for reasons that 
I intend to set out elsewhere, this “hyperesthetic response” may be even greater 
in the case of images than of reality, depending, in the end, on the intuitive 
understanding artists may have of such possibilities.126
What I propose, therefore, is a model of empathy that is not dissimilar 
from the integrated one recently offered about the emotions by Preston and 
De Waal.127 Their main proposal is precisely that observation or imagination 
of another person in a particular emotional state automatically activates a 
representation of that state in the observer with its associated autonomic and 
somatic responses.128 My own rather obvious suggestion here has been to 
acknowledge the need to incorporate bodily responses – whether of move-
ment or touch or any other kind of sensual response – into this model.129
There are two cortical areas of special relevance in this connection and 
which ought briefly to be noted. These are the anterior insula and the anterior 
cingulate. Tania Singer and her London colleagues have shown conclusively 
that these areas are activated when subjects receive pain and when they 
receive signals that someone close to them experiences pain.130 It is these 
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parts (and to some extent the cerebellum and the brain stem) that seem to be 
most activated in such cases, and not the entire pain matrix (for example only 
the anterior insula, and not the posterior). In fact, Singer and colleagues 
declare quite specifically that rostral ACC and AI constitute the neural basis 
for our understanding of the feelings of others and ourselves.131 These are the 
cortical areas that play a critical role in the representation of internal bodily 
states of arousal, as well as of emotional awareness.132
What is especially significant here – especially in considering some of the 
emotional overlaps that often occur upon viewing pictures such as those of 
dead or tormented bodies – is the central role of the insula, and the anterior 
insula in particular, in feelings of disgust.133 It is activated not only in the ex-
pression of disgust, but also in observing the disgusted facial actions of others, 
or even in being exposed to disgusting smells.134 Given that the insula, and the 
anterior insula in particular, play an integrating role with regard to a number of 
emotional responses, one may begin to resolve an issue that often occurs when 
viewing images such as those of wartime atrocities or victims – or even with 
more extravagant and vulgar images, such as those that are so enthusiastically 
multiplied in Mel Gibson’s The Passion of Christ (2004). In cases like these, 
the apparently conflicting emotions of disgust and compassion effectively 
combine, in ways that have always been exploited by artists. 
Few would make any claim for the artistic qualities of Gibson’s film. On 
the contrary. Nevertheless, while the distinctions between art and non-art 
are cognitive and cultural, the new discoveries relating to the neural sy-
stems that underlie empathetic responses to pictures, even if they do not 
help much with such distinctions, provide considerable insight into the 
ways in which artists have unconsciously exploited the kinds of knowledge 
I have tried to set out in this paper. 
This may be one route to understanding the neural bases of what we 
choose to call art. But this task must be left to others. The main aim of 
these pages has been to illuminate the role played by our perceptions of the 
movement and actions of others in responses that are felt to be empathetic. 
It has also been to try to understand what impels beholders to the seemin-
gly imitative actions that lie at the roots of all empathy.135 Above all, it has 
been an attempt to flesh out how we grasp the pain of others, in particular 
of those represented in pictures and sculptures. That pain, like our esthetic 
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responses to pictures, can no longer be regarded as inaccessible, as the 
appalling pictures from Abu Ghraib have taught.136 The lesson from pictu-
res is that we should no longer refuse to understand the minds of others, on 
the grounds that they are not ours, or that their condition is always and 
inevitably different. The further aim is to acknowledge not just the limits 
but the breadth and possibilities of human understanding. 
* This Essay represents a combination of two papers. The first was delivered as as a lecture entitled 
“Art, Emotion and the Brain: The Historical Dimension” at the Third Annual Conference in Neu-
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